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Racial Profiling and Whren:
Searching for Objective Evidence of
the Fourth Amendment on the
Nation's Roads
BY ALBERTO B. LOPEZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
T he political kaleidoscope that brought uncommon phrases like
"hanging chad" and "presidential pardon" into focus also blurred
a common message reflected in recent statements made by the individuals
with whom those phrases are inextricably linked. President Bush called
racial profiling "wrong" and asked Attorney General John Ashcroft to
"develop specific recommendations to end racial profiling" in his first
speech to Congress on February 27, 2001.' During his final days in office,
President Clinton similarly urged Congress to pass a federal law banning
racial profiling in an effort to complete some of the work left unfinished by
his administration.2
In general, racial profiling refers to the police practice of using broad
racial descriptions of individuals likely to be involved in a specific crime
to suspect one particular individual of that crime based, in part, upon that
individual's race In the context of highway patrol and drug law enforce-
" J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School. J.S.M. 1999, Stanford Law School;
J.D. 1998, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; M.S. 1995, Univer-
sity of Notre Dame; B.S. 1991, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology. I would
like to thank my J.S.D. advisor, Professor Lawrence Friedman, for his sup-
port during my time at Stanford and June Starr for her previous efforts on my
behalf.
'President Bush's Address to Congress on February 27, 2001, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Feb. 28, 2001, at A8.
2William Jefferson Clinton, Editorial, Erasing America's Color Lines, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 14,2001, § 4, at 17.
3 See Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13-20, 1999, at
30,35 (defining racial profiling); see also JOHN MONOHAN & LAURENS WALKER,
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 355 (3d ed. 1994).
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ment, for example, a Louisiana State Police Department training film
racially profiled potential suspects of drug trafficking as being "males of
foreign nationalities, mainly Cubans, Colombians, Puerto Ricans, or other
swarthy outlanders."4 Whatever value broad racial descriptions might have
as a police technique, the presidential calls to end racial profiling
symbolize another manifestation of our nation's "'unceasing efforts' to
eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system."
The recent presidential attention to racial profiling comes approxi-
mately three years after a series of events unfolded that brought the issue
to the forefront of the national consciousness. On April 23, 1998, four
young men, three African-Americans and one Hispanic, set out for Durham,
North Carolina, to attend a basketball camp that they hoped would net them
college scholarships.7 While traveling south on the New Jersey Turnpike
in their van, two members of the New Jersey State Police stopped the van
for an alleged speeding violation.8 Within a very short time, the two white
troopers fired eleven shots into the van and seriously wounded three of the
unarmed boys.9 The two troopers, according to their account of events,
fired their weapons in self-defense as the van began to roll backward so as
to threaten one of the trooper's lives." Although the state brought
attempted murder and aggravated assault charges against the two troopers,
4 See MONOHAN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 41 (citing United States v.
Thomas, 787 F. Supp. 663,676 (E.D. Tex. 1992)).
5 See DINESH D'SouzA, THE END OF RACiSM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY 283-84 (1995) (utilizing data of this nature is a reasonable tool of law
enforcement because of the statistical differences in criminality between the
races-this is "a kind of rational discrimination"). But see RANDALL KENNEDY,
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 146-48 (1997) (arguing that tolerating any involve-
ment of race in police decision-making processes is equivalent to tolerating race as
the potentially decisive characteristic; as a result, police decision-making should
be race neutral because making race-based decisions sends the wrong message
given the nation's history of making racial distinctions).
6 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 (1987) (citing Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986)).
7 David Kocieniewski, ReportedPlea Bargaining in Turnpike Shooting Causes
Concern in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at B6 [hereinafter
Kocieniewski, Reported Plea Bargaining]; Owen Moritz, N.J. Att'y General: We
Targeted Minorities, DAILY NEWS (New York), Nov. 29, 2000, at 29.
' David Kocieniewski, U.S. to Open Civil Rights Inquiry in New Jersey Turn-
pike Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,2000, at Al [hereinafter Kocieniewski, U.S. to
Open Civil Rights Inquiry].
' Id (noting that the troopers opened fire "[w]ithin a minute").
10I .
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a New Jersey judge found that state prosecutors violated the troopers' civil
rights during a grand jury hearing and dismissed the charges."
The judge's decision to dismiss all charges against the troopers out-
raged civil rights leaders who viewed the incident as yet another instance
where police unfairly targeted racial minorities on the road for criminal
investigation. 2 In fact, minority drivers inNew Jersey had complained that
police singled them out for inspection on the state's thoroughfares based
upon nothing more than skin color for years prior to the 1998 Turnpike
shooting. 3 Amid the highly charged political climate and public scrutiny,
the Attorney General of New Jersey released 91,000 pages of internal state
records documenting New Jersey state troopers' searches of automobiles
on the Turnpike over the past decade."' For example, one 1998 New Jersey
" David Kocieniewski, Charges Dismissed in Shooting CaseAgainst Troopers,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Kocieniewski, Charges Dismissed
in Shooting Case] (stating that the judge ruled that "prosecutors had violated the
troopers' civil rights by taking so inappropriately adversarial an approach before
the grand jury that the hearings were essentially a 'mini-trial."'); see also
Kocieniewski, U.S. to Open Civil Rights Inquiry, supra note 8 (reciting that the
judge criticized prosecutors for failing to provide the grand jury with proper
instruction as to when police are justified in using force); Kocieniewski, Reported
Plea Bargaining, supra note 7 (reporting that two witnesses came forth nearly two
years after the shooting and gave testimony that corroborated some of the troopers'
account of the incident).
1 See Kocieniewski, U.S. to Open Civil Rights Inquiry, supra note 8; see also
Kocieniewski, ChargesDismissed inShooting Case, supra note 11 (stating that the
decision so angered civil rights leaders that they planned to ask the Justice
Department to handle the case because, according to one civil rights leader, "the
judge's decision was the latest signthat the state government lacked both the ability
and the resolve to address the problem of racial discrimination").
" See Koieniewski, U.S. to Open Civil Rights Inquiry, supra note 8; see also
Kocieniewski, Charges Dismissed in Shooting Case, supra note 11 (reporting that
African-American and Latino drivers asserted that they had been stopped on New
Jersey highways because of their race for more than ten years).
'" David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, Racial Profiling Was the Routine,
New Jersey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,2000, at Al [hereinafter Kocieniewski &
Hanley, Racial Profiling] (noting that the attorney general released the documents
on November 27, 2000); see also Kocieniewski, Charges Dismissed in Shooting
Case, supra note 11 (adding to the charged political climate was the fact that a
justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court was the attorney general of New Jersey
when several important decisions in the case were made. Not only did evidence of
the attorney general's knowledge of race-based stops surface, but evidence also
indicated that the prosecutorial abuse occurred, in part, because of the need to quell
the public scrutiny of the police. The abuse that troubled the judge when he
dismissed the charges against the officers occurred while the state legislature
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report prepared by the state police intelligence bureau revealed that police
targeted specific roadways thought to be arteries of the drug and weapon
trades frequented by minority offenders to further their "criminal, parti-
cularly narcotics-related, endeavors." 5 Moreover, the documents revealed
that eight out of every ten automobile searches performed by state troopers
during most of the preceding ten years were conducted on vehicles driven
by African-Americans or Hispanics. 6 Statistically, thirty percent of these
searches resulted in the seizure of contraband while seventy percent of the
searches proved utterly fruitless. 7 Based upon the compelling evidence that
supported the allegations of the State's minority drivers, both the Governor
and Attorney General of New Jersey admitted that the New Jersey State
Police unfairly targeted minority drivers by using a racial profile. 8
Evidence, like that from New Jersey, suggests that the practice of racial
profiling, at least on its face, violates the protection guaranteed citizens by
the Fourth Amendment. Included in the Constitution as both a response to
abuses experienced under English law and a political compromise, 9 the
Fourth Amendment declares that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
considered the attorney general's nomination to the state supreme court); see also
Laura Mansnerus, Racial Profiling Case in New Jersey Puts Supreme Court Justice
Under More Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,2000, at B4 (describing the troubles of
New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Peter G. Verniero).
'" David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, An Inside Story of Racial Bias and
Denial: New Jersey Files Reveal Drama Behind Profiling, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 3,
2000, § 1, at 53 [hereinafter Kocieniewski & Hanley, An Inside Story].
6 Kocieniewski & Hanley, Racial Profiling, supra note 14.
17Id
See id; see also Kocieniewski & Hanley, An Inside Story, supranote 15 (dis-
cussing evidence of racial profiling such as an internal memorandum suggesting
that profiles could be used to identify potential criminals after making a valid
traffic stop for a legitimate motor vehicle violation, training documents that labeled
"Colombian men, Hispanic men, Hispanic men and black men together," and
Hispanic couples as possible drug couriers, testimony from a former state trooper
who asserted that he was instructed to use "the profile" to make traffic stops for
searches while the violation(s) for which the stop was made were "afterthoughts,"
and other documents demonstrating the public officials knew about racial profiling
in the state long before their admission in November, 2000).
'9Seegenerally Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,624-32 (1886) (describing
the historical background that influenced the development of the Fourth Amend-
ment at the time of the Constitutional Convention; among the abuses levied upon
the colonists were the Writs of Assistance, which authorized the search ofships or
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and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or things to be seized.20
As a result, the Fourth Amendment not only condemns unreasonable
searches, but makes it a "cardinal principle"'21 that "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." The
exceptions notwithstanding, a court generally examines the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" associated with a search to see whether there is an objective
justification to believe that contraband exists in a particular location to
determine the reasonableness of the search.' In short, the Fourth Amend-
ment seeks to prevent searches without "adequate justification" and those
that are arbitrarily conducted at the whims of officials.24
Despite the Amendment's facial relevance to this police practice, the
Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States' effectively blunted
any efforts to challenge racial profiling under the Fourth Amendment. The
vessels and those aboard them for the purpose of finding contraband); WILLIAM
CUDDIHY, FROM GENERAL TO SPECIFIC WARRANTS: THE ORIGINS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS 96 (Jon Kukla ed., 1987) (explaining that
Anti-Federalists feared failing to include a Bill of Rights in the Constitution
allowed the federal government to issue warrants and undertake searches like the
English had done in the past).
2o U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
22 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The exceptions include,
among others, exigent circumstances arising because a criminal suspect is fleeing
(McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,454-56 (1948)); safety concerns arising
from impounding a car for use as evidence in a forfeiture action (Cooper v.
California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)); and emergency situations that endanger lives
(Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,298-300 (1967).
' Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32 (1983) (stating that the 'otality-of-
the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of
probable cause" and defining probable cause as "a fluid concept--turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules").
24 Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations:
The Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment
Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442,449 (1990) (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam,
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 411 (1974)).
2 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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purpose of this Article is to examine searches associated with racially
motivated traffic stops after Whren in conjunction with the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" approach to reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
Part II of this Article briefly outlines the origins of the profiling technique
and its application on the roadways.26 Part III describes the Fourth
Amendment as applied to pretextual stops and its truncation in Whren v.
UnitedStates.2 Part IV suggests that racial profiling victims must separate
their search and seizure claims to attack racial profiling under the Fourth
Amendment post-Whren. After severing search and seizure claims, racial
profiling victims can point to Court decisions regarding random stops by
roving patrols and drug checkpoints to support their unreasonable search
claims.28 Because minority motorists may voluntarily consent to be
searched, which makes a search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
Part V investigates the nature of voluntary consent in the context of police-
minority citizen encounters during a traffic stop.29 Part VI describes the
steps New Jersey agreed to take to fight racial profiling on its roads and
concludes that more data must be recorded during traffic stops to improve
protection for minority drivers before the New Jersey plan can serve as a
model for federal legislation. 0
II. ORIGINS OF THE DRUG COURIER
PROFILE AND ITS APPLICATION ON THE ROAD
During the 1980s, the nation initiated a "war on drugs" that not only
increased penalties for violations of narcotics laws, but also created the
need to build more prisons amid the cries for more punishment of crime in
general.3 As an effort to wage a war on drugs, federal police authorities
turned to profiling as a method to enhance their chances of catching drug
smugglers. Knowing that drug couriers often used air travel to transport
drugs, the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") used information from both
local law enforcement agencies and airline personnel to create a probabilis-
tic picture of those most likely to smuggle drugs on airlines based upon
shared characteristics of past offenders.3 2 The DEA utilized the drug
26See discussion infra Part II.
27See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.29See discussion infra Part V.
3oSee discussion infra Part VI.
31 See LAWRENCEM.FRIEDMAN, CRIMEAND PUNISHMENTINAMERICAN HISTORY
460 (1993).
32 See id
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courier profile by stationing plainclothes agents at various places within
airports. The agents then observed travelers to see if any of them matched
the characteristics of the profile." If any of the travelers matched some of
the profile's traits, in the eyes of the patrolling officer, the officer then
scrutinized their behavior more closely and could approach sufficiently
suspicious individuals for brief questioning. 4 In short, the profile allowed
police officials to focus on individual travelers who matched predetermined
criteria while largely ignoring most of the flying public.
Although intended to identify those most likely to commit drug
trafficking offenses, the malleable nature of the drug courier profile
allowed officers to use a great deal of discretion when matching travelers
to the profile. In United States v. Van Lewis," the first case to discuss the
drug courier profile, the characteristics that aroused the suspicion of federal
agents included: "(1) the use of small denomination currency for ticket
purchases; (2) travel to and from major drug import centers, especially for
short periods of time; (3) the absence of luggage or use of empty suitcases
on trips which normally require extra clothing; and (4) travel under an
alias."' As the number of court challenges increased, the number of
characteristics in the undocumented profile expanded because of their
discussion and favorable treatment by the courts.3' Travelers aroused the
suspicion of agents by being the first to deplane,3 being the last to
deplane,39 being nervous during an investigative stop,' being calm during
33 See Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected That
Th ' Infected Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic 'd Eye, " 65 N.C. L. REv. 417,
427-28 (1987).
34 See id
31 United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
36 Id at 538.
17 See Becton, supra note 33, at 436-37 (stating that "DEA agents often gave
no testimony on the particular profile used. Rather, courts in some instances simply
listed the observed characteristics supporting the agents' reasonable suspicions."
Moreover, other courts discussed "profile references" in their decisions but did not
define whether the discussion was merely illustrative or substantive evidence
presented in the case).
3
9 See United States v. Moore, 675 F. 2d 802, 803 (6th Cir. 1982).39 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564 (1980).
40SeeUnited States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041,1043 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that
defendant "became increasingly nervous" during investigative stop); United States
v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that federal agents
observed defendant "appear[ ] to be extremely nervous").
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an investigative stop,4 traveling alone,4 2 having a traveling companion,43
buying a round trip ticket," buying a one-way ticket,45 carrying a small bag
of luggage," carrying a medium bag of luggage,47 or carrying large pieces
of luggage,4" among a number of other factors.49 In addition to these traits
associated with travel, other characteristics not associated with travel, such
as being African-American and Hispanic, also caught the attention of ever
vigilant agents.50 In sum, the "informal, apparently unwritten, checklist"'51
of all-encompassing factors that comprised the drug courier profile gave
police authorities unbridled discretion to stop and investigate anyone
traveling by air.
"' See United States v. Andrews, 600 F.2d 563,564-65 (6th Cir. 1979) (stating
that DEA agents noted the defendant did not appear nervous while his two
companions did).
42 ee United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 (6th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that DEA agent observed
defendant deboard flight alone).
" See United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
DEA agent observed defendant disembark flight with companion).
See United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir. 1977).
45See United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1981).
" See United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342,343 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that
agents saw that the defendant was carrying only a small gym bag and the suspect's
ticket had no baggage claim attached).
4 See United States v. West, 495 F. Supp. 871, 872 (D. Mass. 1980) (noting
that officers observed, among other things, that the defendant was carrying a
medium sized bag), vacated by 463 U.S. 1201 (1983).
48 See United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that
agents observed the defendant "carrying two bulky garment bags").
4" For a thorough list of factors, see Becton, supra note 33, at 474-76. Judge
Becton impressively groups the characteristics of the profile as discussed in court
cases into factors involving reservations and ticket purchases, airports and flights,
nervousness and associated behavior, significance of luggage, companions,
personal characteristics, and miscellany. See also David Cole, Discretion and
Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholar-
ship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1077-78 (1999) (providing a list of factors comprising the
DEA's drug courier profile).
50 See United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d. 1338, 1353 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979)
(being Hispanic as part of the profile); United States v. Coleman, 450 F. Supp. 433,
439 n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (being an African-American male as part of the profile);
United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (being an
Afican-American female as part of the profile).
11 United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 502 n.10 (2d Cir. 1979).
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Bolstered by court approval 2 and alleged statistical success in air-
ports, 3 the DEA decided to implement the profiling technique on the
nation's highways, thereby bringing the war on drugs to the streets and
individual motorists.M To interdict drugs on the highway, in contrast to the
profile used in airports, police chiefly used broad racial descriptions as a
basis to suspect individual motorists of involvement in drug trafficking. For
example, one profile used to identify potential drug couriers using the
highways of Florida during the 1980s, listed among other racial categories,
African-American males, twenty to fifty years old; Colombian males,
twenty-five to thirty-five years old; and African-Americans and Colom-
bians wearing "lots of gold."55 In Colorado, one sheriff's department
implemented a profile of those likely to be drug traffickers that included
being African-American or Hispanic as one of its key factors."
5 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). In that case the Supreme
Court upheld an investigative stop at an airport because DEA agents had reasonable
suspicion that the defendant committed a drug crime before approaching him for
questioning. Id at 10-11. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, directly
addressed the drug courier profile issue: "A court sitting to determine the existence
ofreasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that
conclusion, but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does not
somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent." Id
at 10.
1 Becton, supra note 33, at 434 n.98 (reporting that agents found illicit drugs
in seventy-seven of ninety-six encounters during the first eighteen months of a
program at the Detroit International Airport and arrested 122 travelers); MONAHAN
& WALKER, supra note 3 (reporting that one study found the suspicion of agents
warranted based upon the discovery of narcotics in forty-eight percent of
encounters (citing ZEDLEWSKI, THE DEA AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: AN
ANALYSIS OF AGENT AcTITIEs (1984))).
David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues That the US. Wrote the Book on
Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29,2000, at Al [hereinafter Kocieniewski, New
Jersey Argues] (quoting one commentator on racial profiling as stating that "[t]he
D.E.A. has been the great evangelizer for racial profiling on the highways....
They had used the technique in airports to nab drug couriers and thought this held
great promise on the highways").
55 DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 49 (1999) (citing Joseph P. D'Ambrosio, The Drug
Courier Profile and Airport Stops: Reasonable Intrusions or Suspicionless
Seizures?, 12 NOVA L. REV. 273,289 n.120 (1987)) (among the others listed were,
unusually, white males, twenty to thirty years old, and "whites wearing boots.").
56 Id at 37 (the Eagle County Sheriff's Department in Colorado is the office
cited).
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Police officialsjustify the connection between race and drugtrafficking
activities without individualized suspicion because, according to the former
Superintendent of the New Jersey State Police, "it's most likely a minority
group that's involved with that."' 7 In the minds of many police officers,
suspecting minorities of drug-related crimes is not racism, but "an
unfortunate byproduct of sound police policies."' 8 Thus, police culture
embraces the vague racial descriptions that indiscriminately place minority
drivers under a generalized web of suspicion for drug trafficking in the
name of continuing the war on drugs.
11. RACIAL PROFILING, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT, AND THE WHREN DECISION
Given the broad racial descriptions of potential drug traffickers, racial
profiling victims naturally turn to the Fourth Amendment as a means of
redress. To place their claims squarely within the ambit of Fourth
Amendment protection, racial profiling victims set forth two distinct, but
closely related, claims. First, victims maintain that police exercise their
discretion in enforcing the traffic code to unjustifiably seize them on the
road by stopping them for minor infractions while letting other drivers,
guilty of identical infractions, pass without interference.59 To bolster their
argument, racial profiling victims rely on statistical evidence such as that
from Ohio indicating that minority drivers in that state are twice as likely
to be stopped for a traffic infraction as a nonminority driver.'
17 Joe Donahue, Boss Warns Troopers: Don't Target Minorities, NEWARK-
STAR LEDGER, Feb. 28, 1999, at 1 (the Governor of New Jersey fired the Super-
intendent following remarks such as this that appeared in the story).
58 Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes: Black Men Take Steps to Avoid
Police Stops, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at Al (quoting a spokesman for the
Maryland State Police).
59 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (recognizing that a seizure
occurs "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away").
60 David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving
While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 288 (1999) [hereinafter Harris, The
Stories] (referring to a study conducted in Akron, Dayton, Toledo, and Franklin
County, Ohio, using the number of traffic tickets issued by police as an indicator
of the likelihood to be stopped. According to one expert who looked at the results,
the risk to which minority drivers are exposed are likely to be greater because
minorities drive fewer miles than nonminorities which means police have fewer
chances to stop minority drivers).
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The second claim of racial profiling victims is that police violate the
Fourth Amendment by conducting searches of their vehicles for drugs
without probable cause61 or reasonable suspicion62 to believe that the driver
committed a drug-related crime. Using the information revealed in the New
Jersey documentation, for example, minority drivers point to the failure to
recover any evidence of contraband after the search in the vast majority of
cases as evidence of the absence of ajustification for the search.
63 At the
heart of racial profiling claims, then, is the fundamental assertion that
stopping minorities for traffic infractions merely serves as a pretext to
search minority driven vehicles for drugs based upon suspicionjustified by
nothing more than a broad racial classification of potential drug traffick-
ers.
The Supreme Court described the justification police must have to
conduct a search of a vehicle after stopping its driver for a violation of the
traffic code in Whren v. United States." In Whren, plainclothes officers
patrolling a "high drug area" in an unmarked car observed a young driver
of a truck look down into the passenger's lap while waiting at a stop sign
for over twenty seconds.' The officers decided to follow the truck after it
made a sudden right turn without signaling and then drove away at an
"unreasonable" speed.' Once the officers stopped the truck, one of the
officers approached the truck on foot and saw two large plastic bags of
crack cocaine in the hands of the truck's passenger.67
The defendants challenged their drug-related indictments by arguing
that the officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
believe that they had violated any narcotics laws at the time of the traffic
6The Supreme Court has stated that to establish probable cause requires an
assessment of the "totality-of-the-circumstances" to discover whether there is a
"fair probability that contraband or evidence ofa crime will be found in a particular
place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983).
62 Reasonable suspicion has been articulated by the Supreme Court to mean that
the officer must be able to point to "specific articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion" that crime is afoot.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).63 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
IWhren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
65 Id at 808.
6 Id Their suspicion aroused, the officers made a U-turn to follow the truck,
which prompted the sudden right turn and attempt to get away from the unmarked
car. Id
67 d at 808-09. The officers overtook the truck when it stopped behind other
vehicles at a red light. Id
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stop.6" In other words, the defendants asserted that the traffic violation
served as a pretext to conduct a search of their truck for drugs. The
defendants brought the issue of pretextual traffic stops to the forefront by
urging the Court to investigate whether a reasonably acting officer "would
have made the stop for the reason given" instead of its traditional examina-
tion into whether probable cause existed to justify the stop.69
The defendant's proposed test, according to the Court, amounted to a
thinly veiled attempt to transform the traditional test of inquiring into the
objective justification for a traffic stop into one of divining the subjective
motivations of officers during allegedly pretextual stops.7" Declining to
invoke the defendant's proposal, the Court reiterated the general rule that
"the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." ' In
addition, the Court stated that not only had it never held an officer's
subjective intentions capable of invalidating a search based upon probable
cause, but also that its jurisprudence consistently held the opposite.' The
Court reiterated that it had held "[s]ubjective intent alone... does not
make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." The Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness requirement, according to the Court, simply
validated some police actions "whatever the subjective intent" of the
officer.74 In sum, the Court concluded that "[s]ubjective intentions play no
role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."'75
Despite its refusal to investigate the subjective intentions of individual
officers to make a traffic stop, the Whren Court recognized that the Fourth
Amendment's concern with the reasonableness of a search involved
balancing all factors related to the traffic stop.76 Indeed, the Court noted
6Isd at 809.
9Id at 810-11.70 fId at 814.
7'Id at 810 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979); Pennsylva-
nia v. Minms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam)).
'Id at812-13 (citing United Statesv. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579,584
n.3 (1983) (upholding a valid warrantless search of a vessel despite following an
informant's tip suggesting the presence of contraband on board); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973) (holding that an arrest for a traffic
violation is not violative of the Fourth Amendment simply because it serves as "a
mere pretext for a narcotics search")).
' Id at 813 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
74Id at 814.
751d. at 813.76 1d at 817.
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that some of its past decisions implemented a balancing test when assessing
the reasonableness of traffic stops.' However, those cases involved police
intrusions without the probable cause typically used to justify the search.78
Where probable cause exists, as in this case, the only cases invoking a
balancing analysis involved "searches or seizures conducted in an
extraordinary manner." Cases involving the use of deadly force to effect
a seizure, warrantless entry into a home, and physical invasion of the body
are examples of those rare instances where the Court balanced an individ-
ual's Fourth Amendment right against the justification for the intrusion
offered by the state.8" The Court held that it would apply the usual rule that
probable cause to believe that an individual committed a crime outweighed
that individual's interest in avoiding contact with the police, in the absence
of an "extreme practice" harmful to an individual's privacy or bodily
interests.81
IV. RACIAL PROFILING CLAIMS AFTER WHRFaV
By declaring that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis," the Court erected a major
barrier to the Fourth Amendment claims involving alleged pretextual
encounters with police.' In effect, the Whren holding permits officers to
manufacture reasons to investigate individuals in an effort to uncover
evidence of criminality even if the evidence sought is wholly unrelated to
the objective reason for the investigation. The decision jeopardizes both
the unjustified seizure and unreasonable search elements of racial profiling
victims' Fourth Amendment claims. Whren suggests that despite the "mind-
numbing" details of the traffic code," a violation of which most any driver
7Id at 818.
781d
79 Id
Id (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (using deadly force);
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (entering a home without a warrant);
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (physical invasion of the body)).
81 Id
82 Id at 813.
' See COLE, supra note 55, at 39 (arguing that "[t]he decision gives a green
light to dishonest police work").
"' David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the High-
way, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 556, 559-60 (1998) [hereinafter Harris, Car Wars]
(noting that state vehicle codes contain numerous provisions that could be used to
stop drivers beyond typical moving violations such as speeding).
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can be stopped for if followed by an officer for a sufficient length of time,5
police officers can use the traffic code to stop or search vehicles for reasons
other than legitimate traffic-law enforcement.8 6 In other words, the Whren
decision threatens to transform pretextual searches and seizures based upon
undetectable invidious police motives into reasonable searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment. 7 As a result, the Fourth Amendment search
and seizure claims that result from a racially motivated traffic stop stand or
fall based upon the availability of supporting objective evidence.
Although the Fourth Amendment attack on the seizures associated with
racially motivated stops appears persuasive, the argument fails to account
for the objective role of police officers in society-to enforce the law as
written. Whatever its intricacy or volume, the traffic code is the law and
police officers are charged with the duty to enforce the law regardless of
the severity of the infraction. The essence of the unlawful seizure claim is
not that the police seized the motorist pursuant to a fictitious provision of
the traffic code or that the motorist failed to violate the traffic laws at all,
but that police failed to stop other motorists for similarly minor infractions.
However, cognizant of the fact that police could legally stop most any
motorist for a traffic violation after following her for a sufficient period of
time, racial profiling victims concede that some traffic violation, however
minor, occurred to instigate the stop. To this end, most claims of racial
profiling do not challenge the factual basis of the underlying traffic
violation. Furthermore, courts do not possess the authority to decide that a
body of law is so intricate or voluminous as to escape meaningful
enforcement simply because others also commonly transgress its provisions
without penalty.' Even if such voluminous codes of law could be
identified, courts do not have the authority to determine which particular
sections of these codes should be enforced and which should be ignored; 9
to do so would, presumably, raise separation of powers concerns. The
unreasonable seizure prong of a racial profiling claim lacks the force that
it seems to have at first glance, absent legislative reform of the traffic code
that police officers are charged with enforcing (albeit with some discre-
tion).
8s See LAWRENCE P. IFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME 131 (1967) (citing
a police officer who stated that "[y]ou can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic
violation if you tail him for a while, and then a search can be made").86 See Harris, The Stories, supra note 60, at 311-12.
87See COLE, supra note 55, at 39.
88See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
891 Id at 818-19.
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While a violation of the traffic code serves as a legislatively enacted
obj ectivejustification to make atraffic stop, a search conducted subsequent
to the initial traffic stop is not justified by any such legislative enactment.
Regardless of the underlying motivation for the traffic stop, the Court still
requires the presence of an objectivejustification for the search based upon
the totality-of-the-circumstances to make that search comporting with the
mandates of the Fourth Amendment. In some cases, an officer will have
probable cause to believe that a motorist committed a traffic violation,
which makes the decision to stop a motorist objectively reasonable in the
eyes of the Court, but that does not mean that a subsequent search of the
vehicle is objectively justified.'
As a result, racial profiling litigants must dissect the search and seizure
aspects of their claims regardless of the initial police motivation for the
encounter and exhibit objective evidence to support their unreasonable
search claims. To that end, the statistics demonstrating that a vast majority
of police searches of minority vehicles, such as those in New Jersey, fail to
uncover contraband alludes to the absence of an objective justification for
many searches.9 ' Nevertheless, racial profiling victims must first distin-
guish the searches in their cases from that in Whren, thereby freeing their
claims from Whren's Fourth Amendment straitjacket.
To support its broad refusal to investigate subjective motivation in
Whren, the Court cited to several cases purporting to demonstrate that it
"flatly dismissed the idea that an ulterior motive might serve to strip [police
officials] of their legal justification" to make these stops.92 In Colorado v.
Bannister,93 an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding and subsequently
arrested the defendants after observing car parts on the vehicle that were
reported to be stolen and recognizing that the vehicle's occupants matched
a description of the suspects.94 In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,9
customs officials boarded a vessel to inspect documentation, smelled
burning marijuana aboard the boat, and arrested the defendants for drug
offenses after seeing packages of what proved to be marijuana through an
9 See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
"' See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
92 Whren, 517 U.S. at 812.
93 Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980).
Id. at 2-3. The officer initially observed the car speeding, but lost track of the
car. Thereafter, the officer received the information regarding the stolen car parts
and the description of the suspects. The speeding car reappeared at which time the
officer stopped the car after it pulled into a gas station. Id
9' United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
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open hatch in the vessel. 6 Synthesizing the facts of Bannister and
Villamointe-Marquez shows that the officers in those cases, like Whren,
visually observed the contraband during their respective investigative stops.
As a result, the searches in those cases fall squarely within an exception to
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment that allows searches of persons
or premises if contraband is in the "plain view" of the investigating
officer.97 In other words, the visual sighting of contraband provided the
officers with the requisite suspicion to conduct warrantless searches and
rendered their subjective motivations for the initial stop irrelevant.
Comparing the authority of police to search in Whren, Bannister, and
Villamonte-Marquez demonstrates that those cases do not address the
unreasonable search claims made by racial profiling victims. In contrast to
the "plain view" sightings of contraband in those cases, the unreasonable
search claims of racial profiling victims often involve situations where
police neither observe nor recover contraband during the investigative stop.
In Maryland, for example, data gathered for a lawsuit against the state
police found that African-Americans constituted 16.9% of drivers on one
particular stretch of the 1-95 corridor but drove 72.9% of the cars searched
by police for evidence of criminal activity.9" Notably, police found
contraband in only 28% of the searched cars, which means that 72% of the
searches uncovered no evidence of any criminal act." As another example,
a 1997 study in Orange County, Florida, revealed that although minorities
represented only 16.3% of the driving public stopped by a sheriff's drug
squad on the Florida turnpike, local police subjected minority drivers to
more than 50% of the total hand searches and over 70% of the total dog
searches of their vehicles. " Much like the data from Maryland, the Orange
" Id. at 584. The marijuana was contained in burlap bags as seen through the
open hatch. Id
97See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990) (discussing the
"plain view" exception to the warrant requirement allowing an officer to seize
contraband in her plain view if the officer sees the material from a lawful vantage
point, can rightly gain physical access to the material, and if the material's nature
is apparently contraband).
" Motion for Enforcement of Settlement in Wilkins v. Maryland State Police
at 4, 5, Civ. No. CCB-93-468 (D. Md. 1996) (report of John Lambeth).
9 Id. Interestingly, the report found no difference in the discovery of contra-
band according to race of the driver. Police found contraband in 28.4% of vehicles
driven by African-Americans and 28.8% of vehicles driven by nonminority drivers.
Id.
" Roger Roy & Henry Pierson Curtis, When Cops Stop Blacks, Drug Search
Often Follows: Orange County Deputies Deny Race Plays a Role in Stops on the
Turnpike, but Some Police Officials Agree Blacks Have a Right to Be Unhappy,
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County Florida Police failed to recover contraband in 80% of the searches
it conducted.' Relating these statistics to Whren, the failure to recover or
even observe contraband during these vehicle searches suggests that police
failed to possess the authority to conduct a search under the circumstances.
As a result, Whren's "plain view" sighting cases do not address Fourth
Amendment search claims made by racial profiling victims following a
traffic stop if no contraband is observed or recovered during the stop.
In addition to Bannister and Villamonte-Marquez, the Court in Whren
cited two other cases related to traffic stops to support its conclusive
remark that subjective intentions fail to implicate traditional Fourth
Amendment concerns. In United States v. Robinson," an officer arrested
a motorist for driving without a license and a subsequent pat-down search
revealed that the driver had heroin on his person. 3 Noting that the officer
possessed probable cause to effect the full custody arrest, the Court found
the search to be constitutionally reasonable because the officer conducted
the search incident to a lawful arrest!"' In Gustafson v. Florida,15 a
companion case to Robinson, an officer arrested the driver of a car for
failing to produce an operator's permit when asked to do so during a traffic
stop after which a pat-down search revealed that the driver possessed
marijuana."° Answering the defendant's claim that the search violated the
ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 8, 1997, at Al.
101 Id.
'United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
103 Id at 218-24. The officer had stopped the defendant four days earlier and
had probable cause to believe that the driver was driving without an operator's
permit based upon the prior encounter. Once the officer arrested the defendant, the
officer conducted a full pat-down search and found a cigarette packet in the left
breast pocket of the defendant's coat. Although the officer stated that he did not
know the packet contained heroin, he did know that the packet did not contain
cigarettes. The officer subsequently opened the packet and found fourteen capsules
of heroin. Id
'04 &1 at 225-36 (observing that a search incident to a lawful arrest is an excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement). Moreover, an officer may
not only search the person of the arrested individual, but also search the accompa-
nying premises. The need to disarm the person in custody and to preserve evidence,
according to the Court, justified the exception embodied in search incident to arrest
situations. Id.
0 Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
'Id. at 261-62. The officer observed the driver weave across the center line
divider three or four times and began to follow the car. The car's two occupants
noticed that they were being followed, drove behind a grocery store, and proceeded
down a different street. The officer eventually pulled the car over and found that
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Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned as it had in Robinson and deemed
the search constitutional because the officer conducted it in conjunction
with a lawful arrest. 7 In sum, the custodial arrest of the defendants
endowed police officers with the authority to conduct the searches.
Upon closer inspection, Robinson and Gustafson, like Bannister and
Villamonte-Marquez, fail to dispel the claims of racial profiling victims
regarding the unreasonable searches of their vehicles after being stopped
for minor traffic infractions. In both Robinson and Gustafson, the Court
employed the search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements. Indeed, the Court
in Gustafson, citing Robinson, stated that
[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to
search, and... in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the
person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment. 08
Although officers frequently possess the authority to do so,'" victims of
racial profiling are not generally placed under arrest for the minor traffic
violations that serve as pretexts to conduct a search. As an extreme
example, the New Jersey police stopped one minority driver approximately
sixty times over a period of thirty years, but only issued a citation to the
driver once during all of those stops and did not place the driver in custody
at any time." 0 If officers consistently enforced the traffic code by stopping
and arresting individual motorists for petty traffic offenses, the practice
would incite public outrage because a vast number of the general public
would be taken into custody. Because victims of racial profiling, like
members of the driving public as a whole, are not placed in custody during
the driver did not have an operator's permit; therefore, the officer arrested the
driver. The officer found the marijuana in a cigarette box obtained from the
defendant's left front coat pocket. Ia
107 Id at 266.
1081 d. at 263-64 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
"0 Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Centwy? A
Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Trqfic
Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 222-23 (1989) (stating that officers often have
discretion to arrest drivers for even minor infractions of the traffic code).
"' Kocieniewski & Hanley, An Inside Story, supra note 15. The driver, a
Korean War veteran, said he had been stopped an average of twice a year simply
because he drove a late model BMW or Lincoln. The officers issued the citation
for a broken taillight. Id
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routine traffic stops, the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement is inapplicable to claims alleging
unreasonable searches during racially motivated traffic stops.
A. A Better Analogy-Roving Patrols
Rather than analogizing the unreasonable search claims to the "plain
view" or search incident to arrest exceptions invoked in Whren, the better
analogy is to a series of cases construing the ability of police to conduct
searches of motorists at random near the United States-Mexico border. In
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,"' a roving United States border patrol
stopped an individual at random without a warrant, probable cause, or
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing and seized marijuana from his car after
searching the vehicle without consent."' Investigating the defendant's
Fourth Amendment challenge to a drug indictment, the Court recognized
that the doctrine from Carroll v. United States"3 provided for warrantless
searches of vehicles in limited situations, but the exception did not "declare
a field day for the police in searching automobiles.""' 4 The Court asserted
"' Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
112 Id at 267-68. The defendant, a Mexican citizen with a valid United States
work permit, was convicted of "having knowingly received, concealed, and
facilitated the transportation of a large quantity of illegally imported marihuana"
after being stopped twenty-five air miles north of the Mexican border. The
government argued that the Constitution allowed random searches and seizures by
rovingpatrols without individualized suspicion ofwrongdoing "within areasonable
distance from any external boundary of the United States." Id. at 268. However, the
defendant asserted that the roving searches and seizures violated the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 267. As a result, the Court faced the issue ofwhether the Fourth
Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable allowed for
random searches and seizures of motorists on the highway.
.. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
"4 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 269. Carroll was the first case to delineate the
movable vehicle exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. In
Carroll, three federal prohibition agents stopped a vehicle they suspected of
carrying whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition Act. Once they stopped
the vehicle, the agents searched the car and uncovered sixty-nine quarts ofwhiskey
behind the upholstering of one seat. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 174. Challenging their
convictions, the defendants asserted that the search violated the Fourth Amendment
because the officers failed to obtain a warrant for the search. See id. at 132. The
Court upheld the convictions reasoning that a search and seizure are valid if made
upon probable cause in light of all the circumstances known to the seizing officer.
Id at 149. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that Congress historically
deemed searches of movable vessels valid because:
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that "[a]utomobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the
search.'.. Although the government contended that the difficulty of
patrolling the border justified the random stops, the Court held that such
intrusions by "roving patrols" without any suspicion of wrongdoing
violated the rights of motorists to be free from "unreasonable searches and
seizures."...6 The Court feared that allowing officers in the field to conduct
searches and seizures at their discretion led to random violations of the
the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of
the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of
a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper
official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat,
wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Id at 153. See also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). In Carney, Drug
Enforcement Administration agents entered a motor home without a warrant or
consent where they seized marijuana, plastic bags, and a scale. Id at 388. The
Court opined that the ready mobility of vehicles did not constitute the only basis for
the movable vehicle exception. In addition to their ready mobility, according to
the Court, the public had a decreased expectation of privacy in their cars than
in their homes. Id. at 391. The limited expectation of privacy arose not because
the area to be searched was in plain view, but because of the "pervasive regula-
tion of vehicles-capable of traveling on the public highways." Id at 392. As a
result, the Court declared that the traveling public was fully aware of a limited right
of privacy in their cars because of the "compelling governmental need for
regulation." Id Moreover, the Court reasoned that the public has long been on
notice that moving vehicles could be stopped and searched by authorities based
upon facts giving rise to a probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains illegal
materials. Id.
US Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 269.
" 61d at 273. The government also argued that precedent involving warrantless
administrative searches justified the random stops based upon Camara v.
Municipal Court ofSan Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches
to enforce community health standards), Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (warrantless searches to enforce liquor regulations), and
UnitedStates v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (administrative searches that burden
gun dealers). The Court disagreed, reasoning that it had demanded a warrant or
consent in Camara and that the other administrative cases involved closely-
regulated businesses where participation inthe business, in effect, included consent
to inspection. A lmeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 270-71. Moreover, the Court pointed
out that the officers in Colonnade and Biswell knew that "the individual searched
was within the proper scope of official scrutiny." Id at 271.
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Fourth Amendment." 7 Characterizing the depth of its concern, the Court
declared that "[u]ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most
effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government."' '
Taking the Court's concerns in Almeida-Sanchez out of the border
control context and placing them on the nation's roads adds significant
weight to the unreasonable search claims made by racial profiling victims.
In cases involving racial profiling, police typically possess a great deal of
latitude in deciding whom to stop based upon a nonspecific description of
potential criminal offenders that emphasizes the race of such individuals.
Evidence in one racial profiling case in Maryland, for example, revealed
that the Maryland State Police instructed troopers to look out for drug
couriers and identified such individuals as "predominantly black males and
black females."' 9 Evidence from another case in Maryland further revealed
that its state police encouraged troopers to stop and search minority drivers
using a race-centered profile that targeted "1) young, black males wearing
expensive jewelry; 2) driving expensive cars, usually sports cars; 3)
carrying beepers; and 4) in possession of telephone numbers."'2 These
descriptions provide officers with not only a reason to suspect any minority
driver of drug-related crimes at their discretion, but also to search minority
driven vehicles, particularly since facts such as the presence of beepers and
telephone numbers cannot be discovered without a search. As evidence that
race is the underlying motivation for traffic stops and searches, one officer
testified in United States v. Harvey2' that "if the occupants had not been
African-Americans, he would not have stopped the car."'" Similarly, an
officer in Florida consoled a nonminority driver after stopping the motorist
for a traffic infraction by saying that things "[c]ould be worse-could be
black."'" Thus, using race-based descriptions to suspect individuals of
"'7 See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 270 (calling the unfettered discretion of
officers in the field "precisely the evil" the Court attempted to prevent in its past
jurisprudence).
"8 Id at 274 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949)
(Jackson, 3, dissenting)).
"9 COLE, supra note 55, at 36 (referring to the Wilkins case in Maryland).
120 ACLU's Class-Action Suit Over Racial Profiling, 23, at http://www.
courttv.com/legaldocs/rights/raceprofiling.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2001)
(recounting the testimony of a Maryland State trooper from a published opinion by
the Maryland Court of Appeals).
121 United States v. Harvey, 16 F.3d 109 (6th Cir. 1994).
'2M at 113-14.
'2 Jeff Brazil & Steve Berry, Color of Driver is Key to Stops in 1-95 Videos:
The Tapes Show That Most Stops and Searches by Volusia County's Drug Squad
Involve Minorities, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Aug. 23, 1992, at Al.
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criminal acts in the absence of individualized suspicion translates into
arbitrary stops and searches of minority drivers based upon the immutable
fact of the driver's race.
In addition to Almeida-Sanchez, roving patrols again caught the
attention of the Courttwo years later in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.24
In Brignoni-Ponce, two roving border patrol officers stopped a vehicle
solely based upon the Mexican appearance of the car's occupants."2 After
brief questioning, the officers learned that two of the passengers in the car
had illegally entered the country and arrested the defendant for knowingly
transporting illegal immigrants. 6 The defendant argued at trial that
testimony about the passengers should be suppressed because it emanated
from an unlawful seizure. 7 The Court first addressed the issue broadly by .
using the balancing test to weigh the interests of both the public and the
individual to be free from arbitrary police interference.' According to the
Court, the government made a "convincing demonstration that the public
interest demands effective measures to prevent the illegal entry of aliens at
the Mexican border."'2 9 The illegal movement of aliens across the border
caused an unwarranted increase in competition forjobs and created an extra
burden on social services providers, each of which generated significant
economic and social costs. 3 The Court observed that past precedent
established that the Fourth Amendment did not ban searches or seizures
without probable cause to arrest or search an individual under some limited
circumstances and allowed such stops on the basis of an officer's reason-
able suspicion."' In this case, the Court characterized the intrusion result-
24 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
125d. at 875.
126 Id.
27 Id The government asserted authority to conduct random searches based
upon the Immigration andNationality Act, which authorized governmental officers
"to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to
remain in the United States." Id. at 876-77. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the
case presented the Court with the issue of "whether a roving patrol may stop a
vehicle in an area near the border and question its occupants when the only ground
for suspicion is that the occupants appear to be of Mexican ancestry." Id at 876.
128 Id at 878 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Mun.
Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
129 Id
130 Id at 878-79 (noting that the illegal aliens themselves are placed in a pre-
carious position because when exposed to inferior working conditions they cannot
complain without risking discovery).
311d at 880 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, which requires that an officer "point
to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant" a fear of his own or others' safety; Adams v.
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ing from the roving patrol stops on the interests of the individual as
"modest."' 3 2 Officers only asked brief questions of a car's occupants and
only conducted limited visual inspections of the car; therefore, the
investigative stops did not consume much time."3 Given the low standard
of reasonable suspicion applicable to brief investigative stops on the
highway, the Court found that the governmental interest in protecting the
public and crime prevention outweighed the minimal intrusion upon
privacy created by the stop."3 As a result, the Court held generally that a
roving officer's reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains illegal aliens
allows the officer to stop the car briefly to conduct further investigation.'s
3
Despite generally allowing brief investigative stops, the Court refused
to let border patrol officers do away with the requirement of reasonable
suspicion to make the stop at issue in Brignoni-Ponce.36 The Court
reasoned that the Fourth Amendment required more than nondescript
suspicion and broad discretion to make an investigative stop. 137 In the
context of patrolling the border, the Court noted that the roads carried not
only illegal aliens, but also a vast number of legal citizens who are entitled
to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures.138 Allowing police to use roving patrol stops without individual-
ized suspicion would expose residents of border areas to a constant risk of
police interference with their ability to travel. 139 Requiring reasonable
suspicion maintained the balance between public interest and the right of
the individual to be free from police intrusions for Fourth Amendment
purposes.1
40
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), which allows a brief stop of an individual to obtain
more information before crime occurs based upon facts known to the officer at the
time of action).
132 Id
1331 Id (noting that the Government estimated that the stops generally take less
than one minute).34 Id at 881.
135 Id
136 Id at 882.
137 Id
"" Id (noting that the population of San Diego, California was 1.4 million
people, the population of El Paso, Texas, was 360,000, and that of Brownsville-
McAllen, Texas, was 320,000 at the time of the case).
139 Id at 883 (stating that "if we approved the Government's position in this
case, Border Patrol officers could stop motorists at random for questioning, day or
night, anywhere within 100 air miles of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a
busy highway, or a desert road, without any reason to suspect that they have
violated any law").
140 See id
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As a final matter, the Court suggested that officers could use a number
of factors as indicia of reasonable suspicion, such as attempts to avoid
police contact or aspects of the vehicle itself.' In this case, however, the
Court found that the officers relied only on the Mexican appearance of the
car's occupants to justify stopping the car. 42 According to the Court, the
race of the individuals in the car did not provide reasonable suspicion to
conclude that the car contained illegal aliens given the large number of
citizens in the areawith the same physical traits. 43 Although the probability
that a person with those physical characteristics is an illegal alien is high
enough to make it relevant, the race of an individual, standing alone, did
not justify stopping everyone for questioning who exhibited those
characteristics.'" As a result, the Court diminished the discretion of
officers to stop individuals for questioning about criminal acts based upon
the immutable trait of race.
Although the Court generally upheld brief investigative stops in
Brignoni-Ponce,4- its concerns in that case apply with equal force to the
searches conducted during racially motivated stops."4 While the initial
questioning might be brief like that in Brignoni-Ponce, aracially motivated
traffic stop can consume a great deal of time in its entirety. Evidence from
a class action suit in Maryland, for example, indicates that police searches
of minority driven vehicles take at least forty minutes.'47 In one particularly
egregious example, Maryland State Police officers allegedly detained a
minority driver for three hours while searching for narcotics in his
41 Id. at 884-85 (citing United States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941, 943-44
(9thCir. 1974) (erratic driving near Border Patrol traffic checkpoint); United States
v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 1973) (certain models of station
wagons used to transport illegal aliens in floor compartment); United States v.
Wright, 476 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir. 1973) (station wagon spare tire compart-
ments used to transport illegal aliens); Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276,
1277 (9th Cir. 1970) (evading the police)).
142 Id at 885-86.
143 Id at 886 (stating that the officers only caught "a fleeting glimpse of the
persons in the moving car, illuminated by headlights").
144Id at 886-87.
14Id at 881 ("[I]n appropriate circumstances the Fourth Amendment allows
a properly limited 'search' or 'seizure' on facts that do not constitute probable
cause to arrest or search for contraband or evidence ofa crime.") (emphasis added).
" Id at 882 (noting the "potentially unlimited interference with [residents'] use
of the highways" that would result if officers had complete discretion).
47 SeeACLU's Class-Action Suit Over Racial Profiling, supra note 120, 46-
54 (documenting the experiences of minority drivers who were detained for as long
as forty minutes to three hours).
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vehicle."' The state troopers subjected the minority motorist to two
searches--one by hand and the other by use of a drug-sniffing dog, which
increased the length of the stop because the dog had to be transported to the
location. 49 Similarly, Maryland state troopers allegedly spent ninety
minutes conducting hand and dog searches of a minority driven vehicle
after stopping the motorist for a violation of a Maryland law regulating car
air fresheners.'10 Thus, unlike the stop in Brignoni-Ponce, where the Court
characterized the intrusion upon individual privacy as "modest" in light of
its brevity,"' searches conducted during a racially motivated traffic stop
typically cannot be considered "brief' in any sense of the word.
The time consumed by a racially motivated search is not only long, but
the nature of the search itself unjustifiably intrudes upon the privacy
interest of an individual minority driver to an extent not addressed in
Brignoni-Ponce. Searching minority driven vehicles by hand is a particu-
larly invasive method to detect the presence of contraband. In one case,
officers allegedly unpacked a minority driver's belongings and placed them
along the roadside for inspection.5 2 After finding no contraband, the
officers told the minority driver that he would have to repack his car by
himself.'53 Even more troubling is a case where troopers allegedly first
searched a minority driver's luggage by hand and then proceeded to search
the vehicle itself by dismantling part of a door panel, a seat panel, and part
of the sunroof."5 Again finding no contraband, one of the troopers handed
the minority driver a screwdriver and told him "you're going to need
this."'55 Similarly, an officer who allegedly left a minority driver's
belongings unpacked along the roadside after finding no evidence of drug-
related crimes told the individual to "have a good day."'56 The evidence in
148Id 51.
'4 Id (noting that the driver refused to consent to a search after which an argu-
ment about the issue continued for forty minutes).
' Id 49 (reporting that the police subjected the driver to a hand search of the
driver's belongings and car and a dog sniffing search).
' Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 879-80.
' 2ACLU's Class-Action Suit Over Racial Profiling, supra note 120, 47.
153 Id
"skL 48 (alleging that the police officers made the occupants of the vehicle
stand outside of the vehicle in the rain while they searched in vain for evidence of
narcotics violations). When one of the occupants informed the officer that he had
contracted pneumonia twice in the recent past and desired to get out of the rain, one
of the officers threatened to take him to jail. Id
155 Id
'6Id 53 (characterizing the belongings as strewn along the roadway).
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Maryland also revealed the equally invasive practice of police conducting
dog searches of vehicles by releasing the dogs inside the vehicles to sniff
the interior of the cars."5 7 The complaint also alleges that Maryland troopers
routinely removed a driver's belongings, such as a piece of luggage, from
the car so that the dog could sniff them by the roadside.' In sum, the
nature of either hand or dog searches conducted during racially motivated
traffic stops exposes minority drivers to an unacceptable degree of intrusion
and humiliation.
The Court's concern in Brignoni-Ponce that unfettered police discre-
tion risked unlimited police intrusion into the lives of citizens has been
shown to be well-founded. Searches conducted in conjunction with a racial
profile place vast numbers of innocent motorists at risk of being searched
without justification. Racial descriptions like those from Louisiana or
Maryland fail to provide officers with any measure of individualized
suspicion and place all minority drivers under suspicion for committing
drug-related crimes. While police possess a great deal of discretion in
enforcing the traffic code, such discretion fails to translate into successful
detection of drug-related crimes in the context of racially motivated traffic
searches. The number of racially motivated searches that uncover no
contraband serve as evidence of the risk to which minority drivers are
unreasonably exposed. For example, a Colorado sheriff's department
admittedly used traffic violations as a pretext to search minority driven
vehicles for drugs.5 9 Evidence from a lawsuit against the department
revealed that police had stopped and searched over 400 motorists based
upon the profile, yet the police did not issue one single traffic citation to
these minority drivers nor did they make any drug arrests."6° As another
example, a review of 1000 police stops in Volusia County, Florida on an
interstate highway revealed that minorities drove eighty percent of the cars
searched for drugs; however, only nine of these stops and searches resulted
in as much as a traffic citation.' In short, the general failure of police to
make drug arrests after searching minority driven cars suggests that they
did not have probable cause to conduct a search, thereby unduly infringing
upon the privacy of the individual minority driver.
1sTId 43.
158 Id
159 COLE, supra note 55, at 37-38 (noting that the overt switch in policy to
pretextual stops resulted after a district attorney dismissed drug charges against
three minority defendants after evidence showed that the defendants' race and out
of state plates on the car motivated the initial traffic stop).
I6 ld at 38 (noting that the county settled the lawsuit for $800,000 in 1995).
I ld at 37.
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B. The Road as a Drug Checkpoint
Since police officers search minority driven vehicles for drugs, claims
of Fourth Amendment violations by racial profiling victims are not only
comparable to those involved at the border, but also to those conducted at
drug checkpoints. Given the frequency of searches and seizures of minority
drivers on the road, the road itself is like one continuous drug checkpoint
where patrolling officers exercise unfettered discretion to stop and search
minority drivers for alleged drug violations. For example, one traveler in
Oklahoma found that he could not drive with his son for a mere thirty
minutes on the roads in that state without being confronted by police twice,
once for questioning and the other for a two and one-half hour full-vehicle
search that produced no contraband. 62 Moreover, a vast number of minority
drivers describe similar encounters with police while driving on the
nation's roads. 63 Indeed, being stopped and searched while driving has
become so common for African-Americans that the experience has its own
acronym-DWB--driving while black.'"
The Supreme Court highlighted its concerns underlying the implemen-
tation of drug checkpoints and addressed their constitutionality in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond.'65 The Court began by recognizing that its
precedents created several exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's general
requirement of individualized suspicion of criminal activity." For
example, the Court noted that its past decisions upheld the constitutionality
162 David A. Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation's
Highways, An American Civil Liberties Union Special Report, June 1999, at 1,
http://www.aclu.org/profiling/reportlindex.html (documenting the case of U.S.
Army Sergeant First Class Rossano V. Gerald and his son as they drove into
Oklahoma. The second stop lasted 2.5 hours during which time the officers
searched the vehicle but found nothing.).
"Id at 8-17 (recounting numerous newspaper articles from around the country
involving searches of minority drivers after being stopped for a traffic infraction);
see also infra note 200 (listing newspaper stories linking police stops and searches
of a vehicle to the race of the driver).
'"Fletcher, supra note 58.
165 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (analyzing the constitu-
tionality of drug checkpoints set up at various points on Indianapolis' roads in an
effort to catch those involved in drug trafficking). After being stopped at one of the
checkpoints, two individuals initiated a class action suit on behalf of themselves
and all who had been or would be stopped at the checkpoints asserting that the drug
checks violated the Fourth Amendment. Id at 36.
' Id at 37 (characterizing the exceptions as occurring under "limited circum-
stances").
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of searches and seizures at border patrol checkpoints based upon the
nation's interest in policing its borders and at sobriety checkpoints because
of the compelling public interest in highway safety.67 However, the Court
observed that it had also invalidated a suspicionless stop to check a driver's
license and registration at the discretion of the investigating officer in
Delaware v. Prouse 68 According to the Court, the "standardless and
167 1d (citing to United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990)).
168 Id at 39-40 (citing to Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)). In Prouse,
the Court observed that the Fourth Amendment protected the privacy interests of
individuals by serving as a check against arbitrary searches and searches performed
at the discretion of governmental officials. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54. As a result,
' the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion
of legitimate governmental interests." Id. at 654. Attempting to justify tipping the
balance in its favor, the government contended that license and registration checks
furthered the state's interest in highway safety and outweighed the privacy
concerns of the individual motorist. See id at 658. The Court, however, analogized
the spot license and registration checks to other police measures previously
declared unconstitutional. In a prior case, the Court held random stops of vehicles
near an international border to determine whether they contained illegal aliens or
contraband under the Fourth Amendment to be unconstitutional because of their
intrusive nature. Id at 655 (referring to United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.
873 (1975)). Like the previous case, the spot checks at issue in Prouse physically
and psychologically intruded upon the motorists in a manner greater than that
allowed by the Fourth Amendment. See id at 657. Both of the practices involved
a "possibly unsettling show of authority," "interfere[d] with freedom of move-
ment," inconvenienced the motorist, and consumed time. Id From a psychological
standpoint, each practice also created the potential for "substantial anxiety." Id As
a result, the Court deemed the intrusions visited upon motorists in this case to be
equivalent to those occasioned by prior police practices prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. Id In addition to highlighting the intrusive nature of the random
license and registration stops, the Court noted that the state had vehicle regulations
regarding registration, annual inspections, and insurance that served to further the
state's interest in highway safety. Id at 658-59. The Court presumed that
unlicensed drivers violated such traffic and equipment regulations in greater
numbers when compared to licensed drivers. Id at 659. As a result, the Court
deemed the state's spot checks to be inefficient because licenses and registrations
are typically presented to officers as part of a routine traffic stop, which is more
likely to involve unlicensed as opposed to licensed drivers. Id at 659-60. Any
contribution to public safety on the highways by performing spot checks in this
fashion would be "marginal at best." Id at 660. Thus, the Court found that the
random investigative stop for a license and registration check did "not appear
sufficiently productive to qualify as a reasonable law enforcement practice under
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unconstrained discretion" exercised by officers implementing the license
and registration program in Prouse made those stops unconstitutional.
69
Thus, the common link among the Court's checkpointjurisprudence is that
it found them constitutional when supported by a substantial and particular-
ized public interest.
Investigating the constitutionality of the drug checkpoints at issue in
Edmond, the Court maintained that the appropriate test to determine the
constitutionality of such programs involved considering the public interests
threatened in relation to the police tactics at issue. 7 In Edmond, the Court
found that unlike its past decisions upholding the constitutionality of
checkpoints, the city of Indianapolis operated its checkpoint program solely
to interdict illegal narcotics. 7' Comparing the primary purpose of the
Indianapolis checkpoints to the "general interest in crime control" in
Prouse, the Court pronounced that it had "never approved a checkpoint
program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing."'" Although the Court observed that the detection of
criminal wrongdoing indirectly served to promote community safety, the
drug checkpoints inEdmondfailed to protect an "immediate, vehicle-bound
threat" to the public interest'" As a result, the Court refused "to suspend
the usual requirement of individualized suspicion" where checkpoints are
justified "only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that
interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has
committed some crime."'74 If allowed to search and seize individuals in this
manner, the Court feared that "the Fourth Amendment would do little to
prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life." 75
the Fourth Amendment." Id Noting that a motorist retained a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her vehicle, the Court found that the minimal benefit to
public safety in light of the physical and psychological intrusions experienced by
a motorist due to random license and registration checks outweighed the state's
professed interest in roadway safety. Id at 655-62.
'69 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661).
110 Id at 39-40.
"I Id at 40-41 (noting that both parties stipulated to the interdiction of drugs
as being the purpose for the checkpoints, which coincided with the findings of
courts previously involved with the case). Documents inthe case explicitly referred
to "drug checkpoints" or "drug roadblocks" and a checkpoint was identified as a
"NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT" to oncoming drivers. Id at 41.
'Id at 41.
'" Id. at 43 (observing that the sobriety checkpoints at issue in Sitz guarded
against an "immediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb").
174 1d at 44.
175Id at 42.
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Attempting to circumnavigate the Court's finding that the city used the
checkpoints for the ordinary investigation of crime, Indianapolis asserted
that Whren precluded an examination of the purpose of its program. 6
However, the Court responded that its "cases dealing with intrusions that
occur pursuant to a general scheme absent individualized suspicion have
often required an inquiry into purpose at the programmatic level."'"
According to the Court, the Whren decision itself demonstrated that
inquiries into the programmatic purposes of schemes undertaken without
individualized suspicion are relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.
78
While it recognized the difficulty inherent in determining the purposes
underlying any program, the Court noted that it normally undertook such
inquiries to differentiate between lawful and unlawful governmental
conduct."' In this case, the Court urged that "[w]hen law enforcement
authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints
such as here.., stops can only be justified by some quantum of individual-
ized suspicion." '' 8 Although it warned that its conclusion did not amount
to an "invitation to probe the minds" of police officers, the Court found the
Indianapolis drug checkpoints to be "indistinguishable from the general
interest in crime control" and held that the Indianapolis program ran afoul
of the Fourth Amendment.
81
The concerns drivingthe Court's decision inEdmond-the purpose and
programmatic nature of the checkpoints-apply with equal force to the
unreasonable search claims of racial profiling victims on the roadways. The
fundamental and only reason to conduct a search of a racial profiling
victim's vehicle is to discover evidence of criminal behavior. In the context
of race-based searches, significant evidence exists indicating that the
motive for the stops is the interdiction of unlawful drugs. For example,
some police agencies admit to utilizing special police units that make traffic
stops as a precursor to drug searches.8 2 The Court has held that police
'76Id at45 (Indianapolis cited to Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
and Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) to support its position).
"nid at 46.
8 Id at 45-46.
1'79 Id at 46-47.
801id at 47.
81 Id at 48. The Court stated that its holding did not affect border patrol searches,
airport searches, searches conducted beyond the general interest in crime control, or
checkpoints conducted pursuant to a lawful primary purpose even though such a
check might result in an arrest unrelated to the purpose of the checkpoint. See id at
47.
112 See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV.
333, 352-53 (1998) (referring to the Criminal Patrol Unit of the Orange County,
Florida Sheriffs Office and the Special Emphasis Team of the North Carolina
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forces can utilize drug sniffing dogs without establishing probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to justify the drug search.' Thus, the intent under-
lying the searches of minority drivers without any objective justification
(other than a non-specific correlation between minorities and criminality)
is to detect narcotics in the car of the minority driver. In other words, using
the language from Edmond, the primary purpose underlying the searches of
racial profiling victims is to uncover "evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing."'"M
While deterring drug usage and associated crimes benefits the commu-
nity, drug trafficking does not sufficiently threaten community safety to
justify searches based on race. The transportation of drugs does not pose
the "life and limb" threat to public safety on the highways that other
activities, such as drunk driving, do."5 Moreover, the practice of searching
minority motorists cannot be justified by pointing to a national interest in
searching minorities for potential drug violations. Indeed, the candidates in
the most recent Presidential election spent little time debating the enforce-
ment of narcotics laws and instead focused on issues such as education,
taxes, and prescription drugs. The only justification forthese searches is the
chance that the searches will uncover evidence of a crime; however,
Edmond explicitly proscribes searches of this nature. Nonetheless, the
frequency with which minority drivers are searched without probable cause
makes the Court's fear that routine searches of this nature would render the
Fourth Amendment meaningless unusually insightful." 6 The DWB
acronym stands as a concrete testament to the reality of that fear.
8 7
Not only is the primary purpose of racial profiling searches to uncover
evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, but the effort to search minority
drivers implements a broad program that takes the war on drugs to the
streets. As a result of the success of the profile in airports, the DEA
Highway Patrol).
' See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (declaring that having
a dog sniff luggage in a public place did not amount to a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes because the sniffing dog was a limited intrusion and the dog
only gave investigators limited information, i.e., whether or not drugs were
present). As a result, the narcotics canines can be used without a warrant, probable
cause, or reasonable suspicion to conduct a search.
lTEdmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
' See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (up-
holding the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints based in part upon the risk to
the welfare of the driving public).
186 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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initiated a program in 1986 to detect drug traffickers on major highways in
the country with the aid of a profile."' This nationwide program, called
Operation Pipeline, taught drug interdiction programs to local police forces
that highlighted the ethnic and racial characteristics of narcotics organiza-
tions.'89 Specifically, Operation Pipeline instructed police how to single out
drivers and cars that might contain contraband by using race as a primary
indicator of involvement in drug-related crimes.' 9° For example, Operation
Pipeline suggested that officers should look at "people with dreadlocks and
cars with two Latino males traveling together" as possible suspects for drug
trafficking violations.' Furthermore, the program included courses that
taught officers to associate individual races with specific types of crime,
thereby embedding the alleged link between race and criminality within
police culture. The state police training bureau offered a course to officers
during the 1990s entitled "Sociology for the Police Officer."'" Within the
course materials, the topic of "ethnic and racial minorities" included an
outline with the following subheadings:
IV. Police Stereotypical View of Minorities
A. Wary of minority people.
B. Believe minorities are more likely to be involved in criminal
activities.
1. Chinese Americans more likely to be involved in crimes of
gambling.
2. Italian Americans more likely to be involved in organized
crime.
3. Black Americans are more likely to be involved of crimes
of violence.
4. Spanish-speaking Americans are more likely to be involved
in fights or taunting officers.
C. Greater degree of hostility directed toward police.
V. Minority stereotypical view of police
A. Are much more critical of police action.
B. More willing to see racial slights in police actions.
C. Feel more subject to mistreatment, harassment and brutality.
'88 See Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues, supra note 54.
189 Id
190 Id
"', Id (noting that West Indians and Latinos in general were also singled out
because those ethnic groups allegedly dominated the drug trade at the time).
'92Kocieniewsky & Hanley, An Inside Story, supra note 15.
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D. Police are symbolic, stand for the power and authority of the
majority, visible signs of majority dominated.
E. Police perceived in the punishment business.
F. Police are a "blue minority."
VI. Ethnic and Racial Cultures
C. Differing Cultures, attitudes and values.
1. Black Americans
a. Blacks value their families.
b. Blacks value religion.
c. Blacks value material goods as well.
1. Blacks who are not able to purchase their own
home put money into cars.
a. Cars important-show individual's style and
personality, just as home would.' 93
In total, the DEA used Operation Pipeline to train more than 25,000
officers in forty-eight states to correlate minority races with drug traffick-
ing 194i . T
Despite repeated denials from DEA officials regarding the nationwide
teaching of racial profiling,95 the evidence suggests otherwise. For
example, one New Jersey trooper testified that he had been taught about
racial profiling during various DEA seminars." The New Jersey officer
testified that he "was directed and urged to stop and search persons who fit
the profile if [he] wanted to make 'good arrests."' 97 Furthermore, the
officer stated that the instructors taught those in attendance "how tojustify
in our subsequent reports our stops and searches so that we would utter the
193 Id
4 See Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues, supra note 54.
'95 Id (reporting that DEA officials maintain that local law enforcement agencies
are misapplying DEA intelligence reports circulated to them). To support its
contention, the DEA can point to findings from a Department of Justice review
concluding that the DEA did not teach or encourage profiling. Similarly, a DEA
spokesman states that the DEA taught officers not to use race when making the
decision to stop a vehicle and to use it as one of several factors when deciding to
search a vehicle. This same spokesman states that the DEA taught officers that
profiling was illegal and a "bad investigative technique." Id
'9 See Kocieniewski & Hanley, An Inside Story, supra note 15 (the testimony
was given during the Gloucester County case in New Jersey).
'97 Id ("We were given wide discretion to follow our hunches. If we wanted to
stop and search someone or some persons, we would stop and search. Any possible
violations such as speeding, improper equipment, were afterthoughts.").
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right words, which would stand up in court.. .whether or not that is what
actually occurred on the roadway."'"8 In addition to such testimony, recent
DEA reports support the contention that it continues to embrace racial
profiling by local police forces to fight the war on drugs. In a report entitled
"Heroin Trends," the DEA sought to combat the flow of heroin into the
country and noted that: "[p]redominant wholesale traffickers are Colom-
bian, followed by Dominicans, Chinese, West African/Nigerian, Pakistani,
Hispanic and Indian. Midlevels are dominated by Dominicans, Colombians,
Puerto Ricans, African-Americans andNigerians."' Finally, the prolifera-
tion of complaints about racial profiling in the newspapers,2" combined
19s Id In 1989, the New Jersey State Police placed the officer who gave the tes-
timony regarding the seminars and two of his fellow officers on probation for five
years for stealing $500 from three people they had stopped on the roadway. Id
'" Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues, supra note 54. The DEA is not alone in
its use of such racial descriptions--the Department of Transportation has made
similar observations and the director of the White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy gave detailed ethnic and racial information regarding sellers, users,
and traffickers. Id.
' See, e.g., Jim Adams & Shannon Tangonan, Police To Record Race of
Drivers: Louisville Policy Bans Profiling in Traffic Stops, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), Dec. 6,2000, at Al; Paul Bird, Suit Claims Police Used Racial
Profiling; Former New York City Officer Claims He Was Target of'98 Traffic Stop
in GreenwoodBecause He's Black, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 2, 2000, at B5; T.C.
Brown, O'Connor Says Racial Profiling Not a Problem, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land, Oh.), Dec. 8, 2000, at B8; Bruce Cadwallader, Federal Officials Expand
Their Look at Detroit's Police Department, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 17,2000,
at ID; Michael H. Cottman & Avis Thomas-Lester, Where Families Fear Police:
Pr. George's Black Parents Caution Teens to be Carefid with Officers, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 2000, at Al; Lewis W. Diuguid, On Permanent Probation, KAN.
CITY STAR, Dec. 27, 2000, at B7; Bob Jackson, Collecting of Profiling Data
Urged, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 30,2000, at A61; Victor Landa,
Driving While Brown Will Get You Stopped Too, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 2,
2001, at A21; David A. Love, The Time Has Come to End Racial Profiling, BALT.
SUN, Dec. 11, 2000, at A13; Solomon Moore, Survey Finds Optimism in State
About Race Relations; Demographics: But Many in Poll Disagree on Issues such
as Affirmative Action and Whether Police Use Racial Profiling, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
4, 2001, at B 1; Greg Moran, Database To Let Attorneys See Conduct of Officers,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 24,2000, at Al; Connie Piloto, Racial Profiling
Discussed: Dallas Police Unsure ofProblem's Extent, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Dec. 27, 2000, at 21A; Heman Rozemberg, Racial Profiling Condemned:
Napolitano, State Police Set Policy Against Practice, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 20,
2000, atB 1; Amanda Vogt, Court Lets Police ConductSeat-Belt Stops, CHl. TRIB.,
Dec. 12,2000, at 1.
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with the national scope of the training program in terms of officer and state
numbers, contradict the numerous denials by the DEA. In the end, the
evidence links the DEA to programmatic racial profiling by local police
forces in a manner that insulated the DEA from accountability because its
officials did not pull over the cars.01
V. CONSENT AS A ROADBLOCK FOR RACIAL PROFILING CLAIMS
Even though racially motivated drug searches conducted by roving
patrols on roads implicates the Fourth Amendment, racial profiling victims
must overcome one last challenge to their Fourth Amendment unreasonable
search claims. Although the Court allows officers to make brief investiga-
tive stops based upon reasonable suspicion, the law has long required that
police acquire voluntary consent from an individual to conduct a search
without a warrant to meet the requirements of fairness in the investigative
process. During investigative traffic stops, the investigating officer
generally walks to the driver's side window and requests to see a driver's
license and registration.0" The officer visually inspects both the car and
driver while asking questions of the driver for any sign that the individual
might be involved in criminal activity.20 3 If any information derived from
the visual checks or the questioning raises further suspicion in the mind of
the officer, the officer can then ask for the driver to consent to a search of
the vehicle.2 When asking for consent, police officers need not inform the
motorist that she is free to refuse consent to the search.205 Not surprisingly,
201 See Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues, supra note 54.
Harris, Car Wars, supra note 84, at 568.
2o3 See id at 568-69 (noting that an officer may also illuminate both the interior
of the car and the driver if it is dark under United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563
(1927), and that if an arrest is made, a full-scale search can be conducted pursuant
to the arrest under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-63 (1981)). The idea
behind the initial "friendly chat" after a stop has been made is to put the driver and
officer on a "friendly basis," making consent more likely. Id at 571.
04 Id at 570; see also Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Removing the Blindfold
from Lady Justice: No Equal Justice, 88 GEo. L.J. 115, 120 (1999) (reviewing
DAVID COLE, RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
(1999)) (suggesting that officers only ask for consent to search "when they have
no reason to suspect that the individual they wish to search has engaged in criminal
activity").
205 Harris, Car Wars, supra note 84, at 570-71 n.1 10 (citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,227-32 (1973)).
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most minority drivers consent to a search of their vehicles. 206 Once consent
is obtained, an officer has the authority to conduct a full-scale search of the
vehicle, including vehicle compartments and personal effects of the
driver °7 Thus, voluntarily consenting to a search of a vehicle ostensibly
eliminates any concern about the reasonable nature of the search.
The Court described the nature of voluntary consent in Schnecldoth v.
Bustamonte°s as being a balance between two competing values.21 On one
end of the balance is the need for police searches and questioning as a tool
for meaningful enforcement of criminal laws2 0 Because of the potential for
police abuse, the other end of the balance embodies society's belief that
criminal law and its tools of enforcement cannot be used in an unfair
manner in light of "civilized notions of justice."2 1 As a result, the Court
opined that the test used to determine the voluntariness of a confession is
206 Id. at 571 (observing that this consent may arise out of "desire to help, fear,
intimidation, or a belief that they cannot refuse.").
27 Id.; see also David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 544,566-68 (1997) (reporting that a stop might involve a search not
only of a car's interior, but also the trunk and even the engine); Gary Webb, DWB,
ESQUIRE, Apr. 1999, at 125 (comparing the right to search to the right to dismantle
the car).
208 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
2 oId. at 224-25. In Schnecdoth, an officer stopped a vehicle containing six
men and asked to see identification from each of them. After obtaining identifica-
tion from only one of the six men in the car, the officer asked the men to step out
of the car and for consent to conduct a search of the vehicle. In response to the
request to conduct a search, one of the men replied, "Sure, go ahead." Once the
officer began to search the car, he asked one of the defendants if the trunk opened
and the defendant answered in the affirmative. The defendant obtained the keys and
opened the trunk for the officer after which the officer found three checks stolen
from a car wash. Id at 220. Challenging his conviction for possession of stolen
property, the defendant asserted that the search of the car and the subsequent
seizure of the stolen checks violated the Fourth Amendment. Id at 221-23. The
defendant claimed that the officer failed to obtain voluntary consent to conduct a
search and conducted the subsequent investigation without consent or a warrant.
Id Thus, the Court faced the issue of what "voluntary consent" means in the
context of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law. Id.
210 Id at 225 (suggesting that without such an aid, the "innocent might be
falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly escape prosecution, and many
crimes would go unsolved").
21 Id. ("[T]he possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real
and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.").
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whether the statement is "the product of an essentially free and uncon-
strained choice by its maker.""1 To determine whether the defendant
produced a statement voluntarily, the Court reiterated that it examined "the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances," which included information
about the defendant and the facts regarding the police interrogation.213 In
addition, the Court held that a review of all circumstances required that
account not only be taken of "subtly coercive police questions," but also of
"the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents. 214
Thus, the Court considered all of the facts surrounding a police-citizen
interaction to be relevant to its voluntariness inquiry and stated that no one
factor alone controlled the issue
15
In reaching its decision, the Court distinguished its investigation into
the voluntariness of consent from that of a waiver of a constitutional right,
which requires the state to show that an individual made "an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment ofa known right or privilege." 216 The Court
reasoned that its waiver test, "applied only to those rights which the
Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant," thereby allowing the
criminal defendant to use every avenue available under a "constitutional
model of a fair criminal trial."21' For example, the strict standard of a
knowing and intelligent waiver most often applied to criminal cases
involves a waiver of the right to counsel, the right of confrontation, the
right to a speedy trial, or the right to a jury trial 8 The Court also noted
that it utilized the standard for waiver to inspect pre-trial processes to
protect the fairness of the trial itself, such as a defendant's knowledge
before the abandonment of the right to counsel during pre-trial lineups and
212 Id The court continued stating that "if he has willed to confess, it may be
used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due
process." Id. at 225-26 (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,602 (1961)).
213 Id at 226 (citing Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (advice
regarding constitutional rights); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)
(educational level); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (age of accused); Ashcraft
v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (nature of interrogation)).214 1d at 229.
2151d at 226.
216 Id at 235 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
2171d at 237-41.
218 Id at 237 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (waiver of
counsel at trial); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966) (right to confront); Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (speedy trial); Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (jury trial)).
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the right against self-incrimination during custodial interrogations in a
coercive environment.219 In the end, if constitutional protections failed to
apply in the criminal context, the criminal justice process could reach an
unfair result by penalizing innocent individuals'2 0
The Fourth Amendment, on the other hand, protected rights of a
"wholly different order" and had "nothing whatever to do with promoting
the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial." ' In fact, the Court
announced that the "Fourth Amendment 'is not an adjunct to the ascertain-
ment of truth."' Instead of preserving the fairness of criminal trials, the
Fourth Amendment merely served to protect the "security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusions by the police." The Court found nothing
"constitutionally suspect" in one's consentingto a search because a consent
search may yield the same information as one conducted with a warrant.2'
Moreover, the Court declared that no part of the underlying justification for
the Fourth Amendment served "to discourage citizens from aiding to the
utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals."'t Rather, the
principles underlying the Fourth Amendment encourage consent because
the search may uncover evidence necessary to prosecute an individual for
a crime thereby insuring that another "wholly innocent person is not
wrongly charged with a criminal offense."" 6 For these reasons, the Court
found a "vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal
trial and the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment." 7
219 Id. at 239-40 (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (waiver of
counsel at pre-trial lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (waiver of
protection against self-incrimination)).
,,o Id. at 241 (using the right to counsel as an example of a right without which
"a wholly innocent accused faces the real and substantial danger that simply
because of his lack of legal expertise he may be convicted").
21,1 Id at 242.
"' Id The Court found in the case that there was "no reason to believe" that
police used coercion to elicit the consent. Id at 247. Specifically, the Court held
that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to
justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth... Amendment[ ]
require[s] that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given,
and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied.
Id at 248.
' Id. at 242 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
224 Id at 243.
Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,488 (1971)).
226 Id
22 1Id at 241.
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Although the Court dissociated the Fourth Amendment from the
criminal context inSchneckloth, the difference between the concerns of the
Fourth Amendment and those protecting the criminal process is not as
"vasf as it appears to the Court. While the text of the Fourth Amendment
differs from those traditionally associated with the criminal process, such
as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,' 8 the Fourth Amendment is in fact an
"adjunct to the ascertainment of truth" because the criminal process begins
in part with a search for evidence. The fundamental reason to conduct a
search of a person or premises is to discover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing to be used at a trial for the alleged crime. If Fourth Amendment
concerns are not associated with finding the truth in criminal matters, then
the Court need notjustify consent searches by pointing out that they protect
the innocent from being wrongly accused of criminal acts. However, the
Court specifically observed that a consent search may be the only method
of obtaining incriminating or exonerating evidence where police possess
facts indicating possible illegal activity but lack probable cause to search
or arrest an individual.' In such a case, the evidence uncovered after
consent is obtained could serve as the basis for further investigation and
prevent the innocent from being prosecuted for a crime."3 Moreover, a
consent search is valuable even in cases where police possess probable
cause but lack a search warrant because the search might not uncover
evidence upon which to base an arrest." In this light, the Fourth Amend-
ment is more than an "adjunct to the ascertainment of truth," it is the
gateway to the assertion of other rights, such as the Fifth Amendment, later
in the criminal process.
As further evidence of the close relationship between the Fourth
Amendment and the criminal process, Schneckloth's concern with the
voluntariness of statements made to police mirrors a similar concern
involving the statements of individuals to police during the criminal process
described in Miranda v. Arizona.2 In Miranda, the Court investigated a
series of cases where police-defendant interactions resulted in police
See U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI. The Fourth Amendment protects all citi-
zens of this country from "unreasonable searches" whether or not suspected of
criminal behavior. By way of comparison, the Fifth Amendment announces that
"[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself," and the Sixth Amendment guarantees that "the accused shall... have the
Assistance of Counsel."
2 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
230 Id at 228.
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2001-20021
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
acquisition of incriminating evidence used to convict the defendant at
trial. 3 The police questioned the individuals in each case without advising
them of their right not to incriminate themselves under the Fifth Amend-
ment. 4 Basing its decision on the importance of Fifth Amendment rights,
the Court found the police practice of interrogating individuals without
apprising them of their right not to incriminate themselves to be unconstitu-
tional. 5 As a result, the Court created a procedural safeguard designed to
inform the individual of his Fifth Amendment right in the form of a litany
of rights recited to the individual before the interrogation. 6 Among these
now familiar rights are the right to remain silent, the knowledge that any
statement can be used against the person's interest in a court of law, the
right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that an attorney
will be provided if the individual cannot afford one? 7
Pivotal to its conclusion, the Court emphasized that the coercive
environment in which police questioned individuals unduly pressured them
to provide incriminating evidence in a manner forbidden by the Fifth
Amendment. Noting the psychological orientation of questioning, the Court
described the environment in which questioning occurred as one where
"antagonistic forces" 8 minimized one's "freedom ofaction" ' 9 and exacted
a "heavy toll on individual liberty."2" Because the questioning occurred in
private, the setting lacked the participation of impartial observers to guard
against police intimidation."1 As a result, the Court opined that both the
tactics and environment of police questioning created "inherently compel-
ling pressures which work[ed] to undermine the individual's will to resist
233 Id
" Id at 456-57. The reported decision actually involved four separate cases:
No. 759, Miranda v. Arizona (indigent defendant who confessed after being taken
to a special interrogation room); No. 760, Vignera v. New York (defendant made
oral admissions to an interrogating police officer and then later signed a confes-
sion); No. 761, Westover v. United States (defendant held overnight after
questioning by local authorities who signed incriminating statements the next day
after being handed over to federal authorities); and No. 584, California v. Stewart,
(local police held defendant for five days and questioned him on nine occasions
after which they obtained a confession). Id.
2" Id at 445, 471-72.
236ld at 467.
37 Id at 444-45.
238 Id at 461.
239 Id at 444.
240Id at 455.
241Id at 461.
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and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."
'242
In light of the respect given to individual dignity, a fair investigative
process demanded that "the government seeking to punish an individual
produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors" rather
than by compelling self-incrimination from the citizen.
3 In sum, the
compulsion implicit in police questioning persuaded the individual to make
self-incriminating statements where they would otherwise not be made.
Reflecting the underlying analysis in both Schneckloth and Miranda,
the fundamental reason that minority drivers consent to unreasonable
searches is the compulsion they face during police encounters. When an
officer stops a minority motorist on the highway, the officer carries with
him a "badge of intimidation" 2" that prevents truly voluntary action in a
Schneckloth or Miranda sense on the part of the motorist. From slavery to
Jim Crow to the racially discriminatory practices of the Civil Rights Era,
social injustice and racial discrimination permeate the experiences of
minority citizens with governmental entities throughout the history of this
nation. In the context of police-minority experiences, minority communities
are acutely aware of police violence perpetrated against their members such
as the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles or the Amadou Diallo shooting
in New York.2 5 As a result, minorities justifiably project a negative image
onto police officers with state authority behind their badges. Unlike those
in the majority, the repeated discrimination experienced by minorities in
this country counsels them to assume a defensive posture in the face of a
questioning police officer with an accompanying sense of "what did I do
wrong--now?"2" As Justice Stevens recognized in Michigan Dept. ofState
Police v. Sitz, "those who have found-by reason of prejudice or mis-
fortune--that encounters with the police may become adversarial or
unpleasant without good cause will have grounds for worrying at any stop
242 Id at 467 (referring to previously noted police trickery and relentless ques-
tioning used to wear down the individual in the hope of eliciting an incriminating
statement).2"3 Id. at 460 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,235-38 (1940)).
244 1d at 457.
245 See William K. Rashbaum, U.S. Says City Has Failed to Release Data on
Frisks, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31,2001, at B5 (discussing the 1994 videotaped beating
of Rodney King by Los Angeles Police Department officers and describing the
shooting of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed African immigrant at whom New York
police officers fired forty-one shots and struck nineteen times).
2I See Harris, The Stories, supra note 60, at 273 (reporting the feeling of one
African-American woman pulled over by police, but common to the sentiments
expressed throughout minority communities).
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designed to elicit signs of suspicious behavior."247 In other words, "[b]eing
a minority in America is like being on permanent probation. You never
know when your privileges of being 'one of the good ones' will be
revoked. 248
This subtle change in the outlook by minorities upon police encounters
on the roadways, the question of whether justice or judge, jury, and
executioner is stopping them, belies the compulsion inherent during police-
minority driver interactions.249 However, the Fourth Amendment, according
to the Schneckloth Court, requires that consent not be coerced irrespective
of the subtlety of the coercion."0 Moreover, a determination of the
voluntariness of consent during a police encounter must account for the
"possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents."2'
'
During racially motivated stops, the imbalance of power between police
and minority drivers, fortified by reports of police brutality and years of
racial discrimination, 2 subjectively instructs minorities to consent to
unjustified requests to search their vehicles. Indeed, many minority drivers
believe that if consent is withheld, the police will continue to observe and
harass them until consent is obtained. 3 If a minority driver believes this,
consent given to authorities during an investigative traffic stop is not
voluntarily given in the sense that she who consents exercises free will in
the absence of compelling pressures and in the spirit of cooperation among
a universe of options. Minority consent during investigative traffic stops is
nothing more than submitting to state police authority for fear that failing
to do so will result in adverse legal or physical consequences.
As evidence that consent is mere submission based upon experience,
the actions of minority citizens prior to police interactions demonstrate the
247 Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,465 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
248 Lewis W. Diuguid, On Permanent Probation, KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 27,
2000, at B7.
249 See COLE, supra note 55, at 23 (quoting the statement ofa California Assem-
blyman).
2'o See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
21 Id at 229.
252 See Maclin, supra note 182, at 33 6, 363 (comparing the targeting of African-
Americans for criminal investigation to the slave patrol of early America and citing
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 158
(1968) for the proposition that African-Americans believe that police brutality and
harassment occur more frequently to African-Americans and in their neighbor-
hoods).
23 See COLE, supra note 55, at 33-34.
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degree to which freewill is stripped during police encounters. Undermining
the free will of minority individuals begins during childhood as minority
parents teach their children how to behave during police encounters.
Because minorities believe that unjustified traffic stops and searches are a
"fact of life," minority parents sadly offer their children advice such as "[i t
doesn't make a difference [that you did nothing wrong]. Just do what they
tell you to do" and "[tjhey say you did something, say 'O.K.' and let them
get out of your life." As a manifestation of childhood warnings, minority
citizens employ various strategies as adult drivers to cope with the ever-
present threat of police interference. For example, minority drivers who
have dealt with the police in the past instruct others to keep their hands on
the steering wheel and to remain motionless so as not to give officers an
excuse to use physical force against them.55 Moreover, some minority
drivers obtain prepaid legal assistance to combat the inevitable interaction
with police on the road.2 6 Apart from coping with the actual police
encounter, some minority motorists drive cars that are unlikely to attract
police attention or change their attire to reduce suspicion while driving in
an attempt to avoid the police encounter in its entirety.5 7 Some drivers even
take routes specifically designed to avoid driving through areas where
police will consider them to look out of place thereby creating the suspicion
of wrongdoing.5 In sum, consenting to a search is not an exercise of free
will, but a manifestation of an ongoing effort to avoid or survive police
' Harris, The Stories, supra note 60, at 274 (recounting the instructions of two
minority parents to their children); see also Rash ofRaciai Profiling Forces Black
Parents to Prepare Young Drivers for Police Stops, JET, Mar. 29, 1999, at 7
(describing the instructions that African-American parents give their children such
as not to travel with anything that looks like illegal material and to cooperate while
answering questions while keeping both hands in plain view on the steering wheel).
"s Harris, The Stories, supra note 60, at 274-75 (citing one mother who will
instruct her young son that he should "[k]eep (his) hands on the steering wheel, and
do not run, because they will shoot you in your back." Also recounting the advice
of Mr. Christopher Darden, whose advice is "[d]on't move. Don't turn around.
Don't give some rookie an excuse to shoot you.").
"6 Michael H. Cottman & Avis Thomas-Lester, Where Families Fear Police:
Pr. George's Black Parents Caution Teens to be Careful with Officers, WASH.
POST, Dec. 8, 2000, at Al.
257 See Harris, The Stories, supra note 60, at 273-74.
2s See, e.g., Price v. Kramer, 200 F. 3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 816 (2000) (reporting that one City of Torrance police officer said "[y]ou're
not supposed to be here" to one young African-American male during a traffic
stop).
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encounters based upon the cumulative effects of racial prejudice experi-
enced by minority individuals throughout their lives.
VI. NEW JERSEY'S CONSENT DECREE
AS A MODEL FOR PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION
In the absence of voluntary consent, the combination of its program-
matic nature and the roving patrol-like exercise of discretion to search
minority driven vehicles pushes the practice of racially motivated searches
into the realm of Fourth Amendment protection despite the Court's
decision in Whren. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens of this nation
against "arbitrary intrusion by the police." 9 Indeed, "standardless and
unconstrained" discretion of police officials that allows for unfettered
interference with the lives of citizens is the problem the Court sought to
circumscribe in its past decisions.2" Although officers must have some
discretion in fighting the drug trade based upon the difficulty of the task,
police cannot be allowed to subject minorities to arbitrary "intrusion[s]
upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based upon nothing more substan-
tial than inarticulate hunches""26 that fail to uncover evidence of criminality
in an overwhelming majority of the searches. The combination of the
legitimacy of the traffic code with the broad, non-specific racial classifica-
tions used as a basis for suspicion of drug crimes provides police with
unlimited discretion to stop minority drivers. Using a racial profile,
however, is simply a substitute for probable cause or reasonable suspicion
to conduct searches where race becomes a proxy for criminal wrongdoing.
Moreover, implementing a racial profile makes the job of police officers
less burdensome because the costs of individualized suspicion need not be
paid before searching a minority citizen. However, the decreased police
burden comes at the expense of minority Fourth Amendment rights, which
cannotbe sacrificed forthe sake of simplicity.262 Nonetheless, the egregious
practice of racial profiling continues because state governments and courts
fail to hold police departments and officers accountable for their actions.
Fighting the arbitrary application of racial profiling in their state, New
Jersey officials entered into a Consent Decree with the federal government
29 Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
o See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-533 (1967).
21 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).262 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,393 (1978); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1,6-11 (1977).
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that attempts to eliminate the use of race at all levels of decision-making
when enforcing the traffic code. 3 From a general standpoint, the agree-
ment attacks racial profiling by either circumscribing police discretion in
the field during traffic stops or recording some facts to justify the exercise
of discretion in particular cases. The Decree begins by stating that officers
may not use race as a factor when deciding to stop or search a vehicle
unless officers know specific facts regarding the race of a suspect before
deciding to stop an individual motorist.' Limiting the exercise of officer
discretion, the decree not only requires the establishment of specific criteria
outlining which drivers may be stopped, but also mandates that officers
request consent to search a vehicle only if they have a reasonable suspicion
that a search will reveal evidence of criminal activity.265 If an officer fails
to obtain consent to search a vehicle, the officer must record the basis upon
which he made the request.l Furthermore, the officer must notify the
driver that she has the right to refuse consent by presenting the motorist
with a consent form to be signed by the motorist as an objective indication
of the driver's consent to be searched.267 On a statewide level, the
agreement requires that officers document the races of those drivers from
whom consent is requested and of those drivers who are searched in the
absence of consent to keep abreast of any racial disparity in the drivers
searched or asked for consent to search.2
As a general proposition, the Consent Decree is a positive step toward
reducing the instances and effects of racial profiling. While requiring
officers to document facts justifying suspicion risks increasing lawsuits
against police officers and departments, the benefits of recording such facts
far outweigh the minimal increase in administrative burden to the individ-
ual officer. An individual driver obtains valuable objective evidence
regarding the facts of the search, before the actual search, that can be used
as evidence in any subsequent litigation to vindicate Fourth Amendment
values. During litigation based upon the "extreme practice" of racial
263 See Consent Decree in United States v. New Jersey, Civ. No. 99-5970 (D.
N.J. 1999) (also providing, for example, that in-car cameras be used to record
traffic stops, statistics be kept asto who is searched, establishment ofa twenty-four
hour hotline to receive complaints, and requiring all complaints be investigated),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm.
2
m Id 26.
265 Id 28.
' Id 32-33 (including documenting the basis for using a drug-sniffing dog
if one is used).
267 See id 31 (the consent form is to be printed in both English and Spanish).
" See id
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profiling, evidence recorded on thejustification sheet could be injected into
the traditional balancing analysis implemented by the trier of fact to
determine the reasonableness of the search. If an officer fails to discover
any evidence of wrongdoing after searching avehicle, the trier of fact might
find that the facts on the justification sheet do not support a finding of
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search. For example, if an officer records
that he suspects the presence of marijuana in the vehicle based upon an
odor and uncovers no evidence of marijuana after a search, the likelihood
that something other than reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
motivated the search increases. In such a case, the burden to show that an
officer possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct a search in light of the
documentation shifts to the officer and his representatives.
While the absence of evidence after a search combines with the
justifying facts recorded prior to the search to make the shifted burden a
heavy one, the failure to uncover contraband does not transform the search
into a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment. Officer discretion to
search a vehicle and the absence of recovered contraband is accounted for
by the balancing test applied by the trier of fact in determining the
reasonableness of the search. For example, an officer may record that he
believed that the car contained marijuana, but what he thought was
marijuana turned out to be ordinary, run-of-the-mill cigarettes. In such a
case, a trier of fact could find that an officer reasonably exercised his
discretion to conduct a search based upon the similarity between a
marijuana cigarette and a legal cigarette among other factors. Such a case
is vastly different from a situation where a search fails to uncover the
presence of anything closely resembling contraband. In other words,
comparing the justifying facts recorded prior to the search to the results
thereof goes straight to the heart of the reasonableness of the search. Under
such a scheme, police are allowed to make mistakes and will do so because
of their well-deserved discretion based upon the difficulty of law enforce-
ment. Recording facts justifying a search prior to conducting one does not
require that an officer's hunches be validated by discovery ofincriminating
evidence, but it does require that those hunches be reasonable, which
coincides with the mandate of the Fourth Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
A fine line exists between the exercise of police discretion in the
pursuit of criminal law enforcement and transgressing the protection
bestowed upon citizens by the Fourth Amendment. Racial profiling crosses
that line by subjecting individual minority drivers to unreasonable searches
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based upon the race of the individual driver. Indeed, the practice is called
"racial profiling" for a reason-because race is the determinative factor in
the alchemy of investigative traffic stops. However, an individual's race is
insufficiently correlated with narcotics violations to justify placing all
minority drivers under suspicion of drug-related crimes without individual-
ized suspicion of wrongdoing. Statistics show that minorities do not use
drugs to a larger extent than their demographic makeup would predict,
which suggests that the suspicion levied upon minority drivers is unwar-
ranted.269 Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the traffic code masks the
illegitimate use of race and its alleged link to criminality in search
decisions by providing police officers with a justifiable reason to stop
vehicles whether or not the officers normally enforce the given traffic code
provisions. Moreover, the Court's totality of circumstances test further
blurs the reasonableness determination because it neither accounts for the
initial objective facts upon which an officer bases his suspicion nor the
compulsion inherent in a police-minority encounter. To provide one or
more pieces of evidence to be weighed among the "totality of circum-
stances" in the individual case, the New Jersey Consent Decree requires
that officers document the facts that they used prior to the search that led
them to suspect an individual motorist of criminal wrongdoing. A record of
the facts patrols the fine line between justifiable police discretion and
Fourth Amendment violation by making an individual officer more
accountable for the exercise of discretion during an individual traffic stop
and the damage thereof.
As a corollary to the benefits accruing to individuals who possess a
record of the facts upon which an officer based suspicion prior to the
search, evidence of unreasonable searches in individual cases serves as a
foundation to challenge the practice of racial profiling as a general
investigative tool. Armed with evidence recorded prior to searches,
minority groups could ban together to bring a class-action suit against
police departments and states utilizing racial profiling to identify potential
criminals on the highways. In fact, the American Civil Liberties Union
recently filed a class-action suit alleging that the Maryland State Police use
racial profiling to target minorities along one particular Maryland
interstate.27 In each case, police found no evidence of criminal wrongdoing
2"9 See Harris, The Stories, supra note 60, at 296 (citing SUBSTANCE ABUSEAND
MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. NAT'L ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., NAT'L HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE, 1997 PRELIM. RESULTS, at
13, 58 tbl.1A).270See ACLU's Class-Action Suit Over Racial Profiling, supra note 120.
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in the minority driven vehicles.217 Because the lack of contraband recovery
is not the sine qua non of unreasonable searches, a record of the facts used
by the officer to justify suspicion provides the trier of fact with a clearer
picture of the totality of circumstances involved with the search in the case.
In the end, if class-action suits are successful, using documented evidence
of suspicion not only strengthens individual challenges to racial profiling,
but also removes the incentive for police officers to search minority driven
cars following minor, normally unpunished traffic violations without
justifiable suspicion. If the fruits of the unreasonable search sour, the desire
to pursue the fruits erodes.
On a fundamental level, the failure to hold officers accountable for
unreasonable discretionary searches highlights the disparate experiences
with criminal law enforcement by the various racial segments of the
nation's population. Any police practice where racial disparities in
enforcement exist not only serves to heighten the tension between police
and minority communities, but also challenges the race-neutral legitimacy
of the law. If police search the vehicles of minority drivers for drugs, the
numbers of minorities charged with narcotics violations reflect their efforts.
In turn, the elevated number of minorities charged with drug-related crimes
provides a foundation to continue using the racial profile. As a result, a
feedback loop develops where the suspicion of minority drivers on the road
not only justifies racial disparities in law enforcement in the eyes of the
police, but also generates the general minority perception that the eyes of
Justice do not see them as equal citizens. Despite the ostensible success of
the civil rights movement, avast schism remains between theory and reality
in the most penal aspect of our body of law. Although Justice is theoreti-
cally blind in criminal matters, she sees color-particularly on the road.
271 Id. Subsection C, entitled "Incidents involving the individual named plain-
tiffs" recounts the encounters between eleven minority motorists and Maryland
State Police officers. lI
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